After the fall on the ground, the abyss out of the field: Inter Milan undoubtedly crosses the worst week in its recent history. Brutal humiliation in the Champions League against PSG, an imminent departure of Simone Inzaghi, coach of a historic cycle, and now, an explosive relationship which throws an freezing light on the club's finances: Inter Milan is experiencing a black sequence. A confidential document, written by a financial advisor operating at the London City, reveals financial management mechanisms deemed irregular, a worrying proximity to influence groups, and large -scale institutional interference. Between fictitious sponsorships, creative accounting, and supposed intervention of FIGC to avoid exclusion from the championship, it is a whole system which seems to have allowed the Nerazzurro club to maintain itself at the top despite an economic reality which, according to the report, should have led it to liquidation, the exclusion of the Serie A or even the demotion in lower divisions. This confidential report written by a London banker-advisor to a group interested in the acquisition of Inter Milan-throws raw light on the club's financial practices during the first years of the Suning presidency (2016-2019). Posted by the Italian site Affairitaliani.itthe document questions the solidity and legitimacy of part of the income recorded at the time, in particular those linked to Asian sponsors.
Almost 300 million euros from China
As soon as it arrived at the head of the club in 2016, the Chinese group Suning set up a network of “regional sponsors” that generated nearly 300 million euros in revenue in three seasons (2016-2019). A figure representing 27% of the total income of the Inter on this period, according to the report. Among these, 131.4 million euros would come from an intra-group Suning contract, and 165.6 million other third party partners, qualified as “doubtful” by the author of the analysis. Revenues from these contracts, often temporary and difficult to trace, are presented as a lever to artificially support the club accounts and meet the requirements of UEFA within the framework of financial fair play. As a reminder, the Inter had been penalized by the European body in 2015 for non-compliance with economic rules, which had led to a settlement agreement imposing a return to balance by 2019. Under the chairmanship of Suning, club expenses increased sharply. The costs linked to players and staff increased from 124 million euros in 2016 to 192 million in 2019, and other operating expenses jumped from 211 to more than 310 million over the same period.
In this context, traditional revenues (TV rights, ticket office) are not enough to fill the deficit. The only rapid and significant room for maneuver is then found in commercial and sponsorship contracts, especially those signed with Chinese companies. Among the partners mentioned are Fullshare Holding (tourism sector), King Down Investment (online trips), Imedia (sports marketing), as well as an anonymous company having paid an entry fee of 10 million euros and an annual contract of 25 million to promote the Inter brand in Southeast Asia. According to the report, some of these companies have no clear link with football, and many have never published public financial information. Before the arrival of Suning, the basic income of the Inter (excluding capital gains on transfers) were around 176 to 186 million euros per season. Three years later, the club saw its income increase by 46 %, mainly thanks to these Asian partnerships, which brought in 2,97 million euros out of a total of 651.5 million. A spectacular progression, but marked by many gray areas on traceability, the real economic nature of sponsors and their independence from the owner.
Rapid growth but questioned
Beyond the atypical income generated via Chinese sponsors, the analysis report evokes a broader set of structural dysfunctions around Inter Milan. He points out a precarious financial situation, questionable management practices, as well as alleged institutional interventions which would have contributed to maintaining the club in activity despite an assessment deemed unbearable. The document evokes a company in a state of negative capital, which, according to Italian standards, should have been the subject of a judicial liquidation procedure. This assertion is based in particular on the gradual deterioration of the club's equity and the debt levels deemed incompatible with the continuity of exploitation. The artificial production of liquidity via “ghost sponsorships” and contracts without economic logic is denounced as a mechanism allowing to bypass the accounting standards and the financial management rules imposed by FIGC and UEFA. According to the report, pressures have been exerted on the COVISOC, the financial monitoring body of Italian professional football (Italian equivalent of the DNCG in France), in order to prevent the exclusion of the Inter of Serie A. A former member of this organization would have denounced deliberate control shortcomings, following external interventions.
Still according to the documents, the FIGC would have set up standards ad hoc Who would have favored the Lombard club, in a context where other clubs have been sanctioned for similar or less facts. The report also raises shortcomings of transparency concerning the final shareholders of the club, as well as control channels passing by offshore jurisdictions, in particular the Cayman Islands, appearing on a blacklist. The situation was publicly commented on by the Minister of Sports, Andrea Abodi, who called for “total transparency, like glass”, directly linking the alleged shortcomings to the need to Commissarier La Covisoc. Part of the report focuses on Giuseppe Marotta, current managing director of Inter. It is mentioned for direct negotiations with the ultra groups of the club, especially during times of crisis. Expressions like “Marotta gives in to pressures” or “resolution thanks to Marotta” are used to describe its mediation in internal tensions. The analysis makes a parallel with the period when Marotta officiated to Juventus, mentioning regular meetings with figures linked to organized crime, in private places, without this having given rise to official surveys. No judicial involvement is confirmed, but the recurrence of these contacts is noted.
The report notes a contrast between the public recognitions granted to the club – like the Ambrogino d'Oro awarded by the mayor of Milan Giuseppe Sala, or the victory of the star – and the investigations in progress on links with certain groups of ultras. The timing of certain public presentations, notably that of the lawyer Ignazio La Russa alongside journalist Fabrizio Biasin, a few days after the end of the ultras affair, is also highlighted as significant. Finally, President Steven Zhang is described as physically absent from key procedures, unable to travel due to the absence of passport, which feeds questions about the club's operational governance. This is reflected in reading the report goes far beyond a simple accounting irregularity. He draws the contours of a system of financial, political and institutional connivations which would have enabled a giant of Italian football to derogate from the rules without assuming the consequences. If the facts are confirmed, it would simply be the largest Italian football scandal since calciopoli in 2006 and the Parmalat financial crash in 2003. The extent of the accusations, the supposed role of FIGC and COVISOC, the nature of injecting income, offshore networks and political complacency could not only shake inter, but the integrity of the entire Italian football system.
